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Accumulation by Securitization: Commercial Poaching, Neoliberal Conservation, 
and the Creation of New Wildlife Frontiers
1
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Elizabeth Lunstrum 
 
 
Abstract: Part of a broader interest in the escalating securitization of conservation 
practice, scholars are beginning to take note of an emerging relationship between 
conservation-securitization, capital accumulation, and dispossession. We develop the 
concept of accumulation by securitization to better grasp this trend, positioning it in the 
critical literatures on neoliberal conservation, green grabbing, and conservation-security. 
The concept captures the ways in which capital accumulation, often tied to land and 
resource enclosure, is enabled by practices and logics of security. Security logics, 
moreover, are increasingly provoking the dispossession of vulnerable communities, itself 
enabling accumulation. We ground the concept by turning to the Greater Lebombo 
Conservancy (GLC) in the Mozambican borderlands. This is a new privately-held 
conservancy being built as a securitized buffer zone to obstruct the movement of 
commercial rhino poachers into South AfricaÕs adjacent Kruger National Park. We show 
how wildlife tourism-related accumulation here is enabled by, and in some ways 
contingent upon, the GLCÕs success in curbing poaching incursions, and, related, how 
security concerns have become the grounds upon which resident communities are being 
displaced. In terms of the latter, we suggest security provides a troubling depoliticized 
alibi for dispossession. Like broader neoliberal conservation and green grabbing, we 
illustrate how accumulation by securitization plays out within complex new networks of 
state and private actors. Yet these significantly expand to include security actors and 
others motivated by security concerns.  
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1. Introduction 
These have been sobering times for rhino conservation. South Africa has been hit 
particularly hard, having lost over 1,200 animals in 2014, up from only 13 in 2007. As 
the worldÕs most concentrated site of rhinos, the majority of these have been lost inside 
the countryÕs flagship Kruger National Park (SANParks, 2014; TRAFFIC, 2014). This 
has led to extraordinary security measures both within and beyond Kruger. Reflecting 
the fact that the park shares a long border with neighboring Mozambique and that the 
majority of those entering Kruger to poach rhinos are Mozambicans who cross through 
this border, the Mozambican borderlands themselves have become the site of security 
interventions. The most ambitious of these amounts to the 220,000-hectare Greater 
Lebombo Conservancy (GLC) located adjacent to KrugerÕs southern half where rhino 
poaching is most intensive (Figure 1). As a collection of private land concessions, the 
GLC emerges as a new wildlife frontier, one in which massive tracts of land have been 
enclosed and consolidated for the purposes of wildlife conservation, the expansion of 
tourism-related investment capital, and especially wildlife security. In terms of the latter, 
the primary rationale behind the GLC is that it act as a securitized buffer zone to protect 
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Kruger, its eastern boundary, and most importantly its rhinos by halting the cross-border 
movement of poachers from Mozambique. 
[Figure 1.]  
As the Mozambican state grants new concessions and works with private 
landholders to consolidate existing private lands into a unified conservancy, local 
communities are experiencing various forms of displacement. On the surface, the GLC 
hence stands as a familiar example of neoliberal conservation as accumulation by 
dispossession or green grabbing. On closer look, however, these practices of green 
grabbing and dispossession are based not primarily on a logic of capital accumulation 
but rather securitization. We argue that the GLC ushers in processes of what we label 
accumulation by securitization. This is a dynamic in which capital accumulation is 
enabled by practices and related logics of security in ways that often provoke 
dispossession, with such dispossession itself further enabling accumulation. Security 
rationales, we show, help provide the emptied land for the development of wildlife 
tourism and in turn the accumulation of capital. Within the GLC, security rationales 
equally enable the restocking of wildlife, which had been wiped out during the 
Mozambican war. More specifically, the Kruger administration is offering access to its 
wildlife as an incentive for the concession holders to protect KrugerÕs rhinos, further 
enabling profitable wildlife tourism. At the heart of accumulation by securitization in the 
GLC is hence the enclosure of both land and wildlife, which enable a securitized green 
spatial fix for the overaccumulation of capital. Unfolding within a larger context of 
neoliberal conservation, we also chart how accumulation by securitization is enabled by 
complex networks of state and private actors, increasingly including security actors and 
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those coming to the table with explicit security concerns. With the GLC, this includes 
not only the security forces of private reserves but also security-motivated actors coming 
from two states: Mozambique and, arguably more significant, South Africa, given that 
the conservancy is designed to protect KrugerÕs rhinos. We additionally suggest this 
expansion of security actors provides new opportunities for accumulation in the form of 
security-related employment. While we develop our observations in the GLC, we see 
accumulation by securitization as a concerning new trend in a broader escalating relation 
between conservation and security. 
We begin by laying the studyÕs theoretical groundwork by engaging with the 
emerging literature on conservation and security, paying attention to its treatment of 
issues of accumulation and dispossession, and then segue into the literature on 
accumulation by dispossession. We build from these to develop the concept of 
accumulation by securitization and then ground it in the case of the GLC. After briefly 
detailing the GLCÕs background, we illustrate how accumulation in the conservancy is 
enabled by security logics and practices. We then examine how a wide array of actors 
motivated by security as well as economic interests are working in tandem to create the 
GLC as a security-oriented wildlife frontier. We conclude by turning to the trope of the 
frontier, showing how security interests are transforming an ÒunrulyÓ frontier into a new 
frontier of wildlife over which sovereignty is consolidated, and finally examine several 
troubling implications of the merging of security and conservation we see playing out in 
the GLC.  
 
2. Connecting the Securitization of Conservation Practice to Conservation-Based 
Accumulation by Dispossession 
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A young but growing body of critical conservation scholarship has begun to 
examine the securitization of conservation space and conservation practice itself 
(Cavanagh et al., 2015; Devine, 2014; Duffy, 2014; Duffy, this issue; Humphreys, 2012; 
Humphreys and Smith, 2014; Lombard, this issue; Lunstrum, 2014; Ojeda, 2012; Peluso 
and Vandergeest, 2011; Ybarra, 2012). Of particular concern is the militarization of 
conservation practice in response to commercial poaching. Lunstrum (2014, 817), for 
instance, shows how Òthe use of military and paramilitary (military-like) actors, 
techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation,Ó is on the rise, 
a worrying trend she labels Ògreen militarization.Ó Such militarization of conservation 
practice is driven and rationalized by discourses of war and national/regional security 
that transform poaching from a conservation issue into a security issue. Following 
insights from security studies, the problems of poaching and threats to wildlife 
conservation thus become Òsecuritized, treated as security issues,Ó through speech-acts, 
policies, and practices (Williams, 2003, 513). Such speech acts also frame poachers as 
the enemy in the global war for biodiversity (Duffy, 2014; Neumann, 2004) and equally 
the enemy of the nation-state and its natural resources (Lunstrum, 2014). This reframing 
of conservation and poaching can lead to Òrepressive, coercive and violent practicesÓ 
(Duffy, 2014, 833) including the state-sanctioned killing of poachers (Humphreys and 
Smith, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; Neumann, 2004). The militarization of conservation is 
further facilitated by the expansion of security actors within conservation practice, often 
including national armies and at times soldiers for hire (Cavanagh et al., 2015; Devine, 
2014; Lombard, 2012; Lunstrum, 2014; Ybarra, 2012). In fact, in post-conflict settings, 
militaries have at times reinvented themselves and their legitimacy by putting their skills 
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to use as anti-poaching and broader conservation enforcers (Devine, 2014; Lunstrum, 
2014; Ybarra, 2012). Building from this work, we see the securitization of conservation 
as a two-step process consisting of an initial framing of conservation matters as security 
issues and a subsequent move to address these issues via security measures often 
instituted by security actors. 
While not its primary focus, this emerging work on conservation-security sheds 
important light on how security logics along with the expansion of security actors help 
realize conservation-based accumulation and green grabbing often by displacing resident 
communities. Looking specifically at the issue of borderland security in the Southern 
ConeÕs tri-national frontier, Ferrads (2004, 420) argues environmental concerns are 
Òincreasingly becoming conflated with other current forms of securitization, such as 
those concerned with terrorism, popular unrest, and narcotrafficÓ (also see Duffy, this 
issue). From here, she shows how these new discourses of securitization help ÒsecureÓ 
nature, and more importantly natureÕs value in order to commodify it, enclose it, and 
subsequently profit from it. Similarly, Ojeda (2012, 371) demonstrates how security 
logics in ColombiaÕs Tayrona National Park are based on Ògreen pretextsÓ of spaces or 
species in need of protection. These logics enable land-grabbing within the park through 
processes of privatization, accumulation, and dispossession, what she calls the Òdouble 
strategy of touristification and militarization.Ó Using the concept of Òcounterinsurgency 
ecotourism,Ó Devine (2014, 985) demonstrates how Òecotourism development has 
become a means by which the Guatemalan state is remilitarizing the northern forests,Ó a 
process that displaces peasants thereby making space available for profit-making tourism 
initiatives. Ybarra (2012, 498), also looking at Gautemala, similarly describes the 
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Òaffinities between counterinsurgency and conservation territorial projectsÓ: both 
national/regional security and conservation and tourism require secure spaces, a security 
achieved in part through dispossession. Taken together, these studies point to a broader 
pattern in which neoliberal accumulation (often by dispossession) is enabled by security 
actors and logics, what we label accumulation by securitization. To develop the concept 
and show how it is unfolding within a broader context of neoliberal conservation, we 
turn to the critical literature on neoliberal conservation, accumulation by dispossession, 
and green grabbing.  
Increasingly, political ecologists, among others, are turning to the related 
concepts of accumulation by dispossession and primitive accumulation to explain the 
overlapping processes of neoliberal biodiversity conservation, land grabbing, and green 
grabbing, that is, land and resource grabs with environmental ends (Borras et al., 2011; 
Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Fairhead et al., 2012; Hall, 
2013; Igoe and Brockington, 2007). The conceptsÕ utility rests in their ability to capture 
a process whereby land and resources are enclosed and privatized and how this 
frequently leads to the dispossession of rural populations and concentrated accumulation 
of capital in the hands of a few. Emerging from debates concerning whether MarxÕs 
notion of primitive accumulation (1992 [1867]) is confined to the ÒoriginalÓ 
accumulation that kick-started capitalism by divorcing producers from the means of 
production (De Angelis, 2001; Glassman, 2006; Hall, 2013; Perelman, 2007), 
accumulation by dispossession, as articulated by Harvey (2003), posits that primitive 
accumulation has never gone away. Rather, it has taken new forms and operates in 
contexts outside of which Marx was analyzing. As such, primitive accumulation is an 
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ongoing process necessary for capitalÕs continued expansion (De Angelis, 2001; 
Glassman, 2006; Negi and Auerbach, 2009).  
For Marx, primitive accumulation was a non-economic means of accumulation, a 
point echoed by others. Luxemburg (1951 [1913]), for example, pointed to the dual 
character of capital accumulation, namely its economic means of accumulation via the 
expanded reproduction of the social relations of capitalism on the one hand, and its non-
economic means via force, violence, and dispossession on the other. The latter also 
serves as the basis for HarveyÕs notion of accumulation by dispossession. Specifically, 
accumulation by dispossession solves the capitalist crisis of overaccumulation, or Òthe 
lack of opportunities for private investment,Ó by enclosing common assets and releasing 
them for private investment where they are then commodified, thereby ensuring 
capitalismÕs expansion and survival (Harvey, 2003, 139). The framework of 
accumulation by dispossession has been employed to analyze a variety of issues in the 
neoliberal economic period from the privatization and commodification of utilities 
(Bakker, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2005), life itself (Prudham, 2007), and, closely related to 
this paper, the phenomenon of land grabbing (Borras and Franco, 2012; Borras et al., 
2012; Hall, 2013; White et al., 2012), along with a variety of neoliberal conservation 
practices (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012; Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Leach et al., 
2012; Sullivan, 2013). 
 Hall (2013, 1598), for instance, demonstrates the concept is vital in 
understanding the Òdispossessory responses to capitalist crises, the use of extra-
economic means of capital accumulation, and the creation, expansion and reproduction 
of capitalist social relationsÓ that are central to the phenomenon of land grabs. Writing 
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on green grabbing also frequently deploys the concept to make sense of ÒgreenÓ projects 
ranging from biocarbon sequestration and climate change mitigation (Leach et al., 2012; 
Lohmann, 2012; MacDonald and Corson, 2012) and nature-based derivatives (Little et 
al., 2013; Mandel et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2013) to tourism and hunting (Benjaminsen and 
Bryceson, 2012; Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Gardner, 2012; Snijders, 2012). Central 
to the latter is the contention that conservation practiceÑespecially neoliberal 
conservation practiceÑis a form of ongoing primitive accumulation or accumulation by 
dispossession as it encloses land and biodiversity and dissolves common access to it, 
thereby dispossessing rural populations of land, resources, and livelihood opportunities 
to provide new avenues for capital accumulation (Bscher, 2009; Kelly, 2011; Neves 
and Igoe, 2012; Sullivan, 2013). Together these studies show how accumulation and 
related private economic gain are enabled by a prior act of violence, namely freeing up 
the land and resources via processes of dispossession, which range from outright 
eviction to the curtailment of access to resources. These practices more broadly have a 
long and troubling history and have reshaped landscapes across and beyond sub-Saharan 
Africa (Agrawal and Redford, 2009; Brockington, 2002; Brockington and Igoe, 2006; 
Cavanagh and Himmelfarb, 2014; Dowie, 2009; Neumann, 1998; Rangarajan and 
Shahabuddin, 2006; Spence, 1999). The connections between conservation and 
accumulation by non-economic means, moreover, can be traced back to MarxÕs original 
writings on primitive accumulation, specifically the Game Laws in Britain (Marx, 1992 
[1867]; Perelman, 2007).  
Neoliberal conservation and green grabbing more generally, however, move 
beyond the trends outlined above in key respects. First, as opposed to colonial 
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conservation, with neoliberal conservation, land and biodiversity are being opened up 
more directly for capitalist investment and then commodified. This leads Kelly (2011, 
683) to argue that primitive accumulation as a framework of analysis exposes Òthe 
underlying economic drivers of protected area creation,Ó namely expanding capitalÕs 
ability to reproduce itself by transforming natural resources into commodities and 
expanding green markets. Related, land and biodiversity are increasingly coming under 
the control and ownership of private interests, often outside of state-run conservation 
territories. This has resulted in the expansion of actors involved in conservation well 
beyond the state and colonial regime to include influential elites (Brockington and 
Duffy, 2010; Holmes, 2012), and entrepreneurs and businesses (Bscher and Fletcher, 
Forthcoming; Gardner, 2012; Leach et al., 2012; Snijders, 2012). Reflecting the rising 
trend in conservation-security, this also includes security actors and others motivated by 
security logics (Crdenas, 2012; Ojeda, 2012; Ybarra, 2012). While non-state actors 
have always been involved in conservation, the wider variety of actors we see today are 
Òmore deeply embedded in capitalist networks, and operating across scalesÓ (Fairhead et 
al., 2012, 240).  
Of particular importance are the novel ways such a diversity of actors form 
partnerships with each other and the state and in which different types of authority are 
transferred (Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Igoe and Brockington, 2007; Peluso and 
Lund, 2011). Given such diversity of actors, partnerships, and appropriation strategies at 
play, moreover, the link between control and ownership over land can be complex if not 
tenuous. Control, which can be defined as Òpractices that fix or consolidate forms of 
access, claiming, and exclusion for some timeÓ (Peluso and Lund, 2011, 668), does not 
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necessarily entail complete ownership or even enclosure and vice-versa (Borras et al., 
2012; Borras et al., 2011; Hall, 2011, 2013). In addition, the literature highlights how 
contemporary green grabbing and conservation-based accumulation by dispossession are 
enabled by the creation and sanctioning of new nature-based commodities, specifically 
forms of non-economic capital like carbon, wildlife, patents on life, and ecosystem 
services to be accumulated (Neves and Igoe, 2012). Such nature-based commodities can 
enable Òspatial fixes for over-accumulated capitalÓ (Corson and MacDonald, 2012, 268). 
Equally significant, the ability to mobilize support for these new practices of 
appropriation is intimately tied to new discourses of environmental governance and 
environmental harm (Fairhead et al., 2012).  
Building from these debates, we develop the concept of accumulation by 
securitization, which helps us grasp important features of contemporary accumulation by 
dispossession and green grabbing as well as securitized conservation. Namely, in cases 
where conservation challenges are framed as security issues and treated as such, and 
where conservation and related tourism development are realized by security actors and 
logics, we are increasingly seeing opportunities for accumulation. Securitized 
conservation, in short, is enabling new patterns of accumulation. This happens most 
obviously through the securitized enclosure of space and resources and related 
dispossession of resident communities: security logics and actors clear the space, capital 
reaps the benefit. Accumulation is also enabled by incentives for securitization, which in 
the GLC materialize in the form of wildlife. And further avenues for accumulation are 
found in the expansion of conservation-security employment opportunities.  
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We ground these insights in the case of the GLC. We show first that, more than 
processes of accumulation by dispossession, accumulation in the conservancy is better 
understood as accumulation by securitization. Here, securitization, and specifically anti-
poaching, plays an integral role in opening up new land and releasing new assets for 
private investment, specifically for ÒgreenÓ accumulation. In responding to Peluso and 
LundÕs (2011, 672) call to Òtake seriously new ways of understanding primitive 
accumulation and territorialization,Ó we thus highlight a set of processes through which 
frontiers of wildlife-based accumulation are opened up through the securitized enclosure 
of land. We further show how accumulation can be achieved in spaces where wildlife 
does not exist in sufficient numbers to warrant capital investment, namely via an 
exchange of wildlife for security. Accumulation is thus enabled by and provides the 
incentives for securitization. Security concerns and measures hence greatly expand the 
potential of conservation to work as a Òspatial fixÓ to the crisis of overaccumulation. 
This is especially the case as conservation-related security and particularly commercial 
poaching gain increasing global attention and become tied to broader national, regional, 
and international security concerns (Duffy, 2014; Duffy, this issue; Lunstrum, 2014). 
Within this context, if conservation-security can create the necessary conditions leading 
to the release of much needed assets, for example land and wildlife, we are likely to see 
the expansion of security-oriented green grabbing, neoliberal conservation, and related 
conservation-based accumulation.  
Second, the proliferation of new actors insightfully highlighted within the 
literature expands in the context of commercial poaching to include a whole host of 
security-related actors, both public and private, whose actions are shaped by security 
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logics and enable the underlying accumulation. Their actions help enable a spatial fix to 
the crisis of overaccumulation and do so in the name of ÒgreenÓ security, specifically 
anti-poaching. The new range of actors also speaks to the tension between ownership 
and control. While the GLC partially reflects processes in which conservation-related 
land and resources come to be owned by private actors (see, for e.g., Holmes, 2014; 
Snijders, 2012), we show how control over them is more diffuse: it involves private 
actors but also two states, especially a foreign oneÑhere South AfricaÑwho comes to 
the table with explicit security concerns. This also underscores how ownership, control, 
and accumulation do not all accrue to the same groups and the complexity of dealing 
with conservation-security concerns in a contiguous cross-border context. Furthermore, 
as security interests enable new conservation-security job opportunities, this expanding 
network of actors underscores another way in which accumulation by securitization can 
play out.  
 
 
3. Background to the GLC: The coming together of security and economic interests 
 
The GLC emerges at a time when the commercial poaching of rhinos for their 
horns is reaching crisis proportions across the globe as a result of growing demand from 
an increasingly affluent Asia. This has pushed the price of rhino horn to over US$65,000 
per kilogram, more than gold or cocaine. South Africa has borne the brunt of this having 
lost over 1,200 animals in 2014, what amounts to a nearly 100-fold increase from 2007. 
The majority of these have been killed inside the countryÕs flagship Kruger National 
Park, which is the worldÕs single most concentrated site of rhinos and most important 
site of rhino conservation. Highlighting the more regional circuit in which rhino 
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poaching has unfolded, the parkÕs entire 350 km eastern boundary borders Mozambique 
(see Figure 1), and the vast majority of men commissioned by criminal syndicates to 
hunt KrugerÕs rhinos are Mozambicans who cross through this border. In fact, the 
journey into the park from Mozambique can be as short as ten kilometers. With rhino 
horn procured, poachers then escape back across into Mozambique where KrugerÕs 
rangers and South AfricaÕs military are unable to pursue them, as they would be entering 
the sovereign territory of another country. Reflecting the cross-border dynamics of 
commercial poaching along with the fact that poaching teams are heavily armed and 
increasingly willing to resist arrest, the South African state and broader public 
progressively frame the problem as one of armed criminals illegally crossing an 
international border, violating national territory and sovereignty, and attacking rhinos as 
South African national treasures (Interviews 2013, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014).  
In response, South Africa has instituted a range of security measures. These 
include hiring additional paramilitary-trained rangers to patrol Kruger, reintroducing the 
military to assist rangers and guard the international border, and using increasingly 
sophisticated forms of aerial surveillance. Together these amount to the effective 
militarization of Kruger and its eastern border (Lunstrum, 2014). Another key 
responseÑone receiving far less public attentionÑtakes us from South Africa, across 
the border, and into Mozambique. 
In 2012, the Mozambican and South African states and private land holders in 
the Mozambican borderlands, backed by the South African conservation NGO the Peace 
Parks Foundation (PPF), created the 220,000 hectare Greater Lebombo Conservancy, 
more colloquially known as the GLC (see Figure 2). The GLC is a consolidated 
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collection of private concessions tasked with functioning as a security mechanism, 
namely a secured buffer zone designed to stop the movement of poachers before they 
enter Kruger. Reflecting the cross-border nature of poaching, South Africa in particular 
has hopes the conservancy will act as the Òfirst shield of defense against rhino poachingÓ 
(SANParks, 2012b, 12). While located in Mozambique, KrugerÕs parent organization 
South Africa National Parks (SANParks) has actually incorporated the GLC into 
KrugerÕs rezoning and related development of the parkÕs Peripheral Development Zone 
(PDZ). In addition to enabling private economic opportunities, the PDZÑwe are told in 
no uncertain termsÑdoubles as a Òsecurity zone covering rhino poaching hotspotsÓ 
(SANParks, 2012a; Interviews 2013, 2014; see also Helfrich, 2012 ).2  
[Figure 2.]  
The Mozambican state, like South Africa, also supports the development of the GLC as 
first and foremost Òa zone of intensive anti-poachingÓ (Interview, 2013). The GLC-as-
security-apparatus in fact plays an important role in repairing MozambiqueÕs reputation 
as one of Òthe worst offenders in the rhino horn trade,Ó and can help the country avoid 
poaching-related sanctions (Fears, 2013; IRF, 2014; WWF, 2013). Facilitating the GLC 
hence enables Mozambique to prove to the world it is working to stem its role in rhino 
poaching, a move acknowledged by South Africa (Molewa, 2014).  
 If the GLC is primarily driven by security concerns, its development is also 
motivated by desires for economic gain tied to wildlife tourism, including both non-
consumptive and hunting-related safari opportunities. The Mozambican state has hopes 
the GLC will promote regional economic development, potentially lucrative for state 
coffers and well-positioned state elites (Interviews, 2013; and see below). Potential for 
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economic gain is not surprisingly the primary interest of the private concession holders 
(Interviews 2012, 2013, 2014).3 These economic opportunities are, however, tied to the 
GLCÕs success in curbing rhino poaching incursions into Kruger. To begin to grasp this 
meeting of security and economic interests, we must take a brief detour back into the 
conservancyÕs origin.  
 The 1990s were a time of immense transformation across Southern Africa. Not 
only did the decade usher in the demise of apartheid in South Africa, it also witnessed 
the end of the brutal South Africa-backed ÒcivilÓ war in Mozambique (1977-1992). The 
conflict left the country devastated socially, politically, economically, and ecologically 
(Lunstrum, 2009; Vines, 1991), with much of the wildlife in the borderlands adjacent to 
Kruger decimated (Interviews, 2012, 2013). Emerging from these broader changes, on 
December 9th, 2002, the Heads of State of South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe 
signed an international treaty that established the Great Limpopo Transfrontier 
Conservation Area (GLTFCA). This is a multi-use conservation and development 
landscape that includes at its core the much celebrated Great Limpopo Transfrontier 
Park (GLTP), a tri-national Peace Park that unites South AfricaÕs Kruger, MozambiqueÕs 
Limpopo, and ZimbabweÕs Gonarezhou National Parks (Figure 2), along with additional 
parks and lands, both public and private. Initially the GLTFCA was also supposed to 
include the development of a buffer zone to Kruger in the Mozambican borderlands 
between the Crocodile and Elefants/Olifants Rivers. This was to be allocated to the 
private sector who could tap into KrugerÕs abundant wildlife and a massive and over-
saturated tourism market standing at over 1.3 million visitors annually (PPF, 2006, 
Interview 2013).  
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Almost a decade after the signing of the GLTFCA/GLTP Treaty, not much had 
transpired in the development of the larger conservation area, even as the cross-border 
park began to take concrete form. That changed radically when commercial rhino 
poaching entered the scene. As a response, the Mozambican and South African states, 
working with private landholders and backed by the PPF, revived the buffer zone 
proposal. And in 2012 the GLC came to life.  
 
4. Accumulation by Securitization in the GLC  
 
The entry of commercial rhino poaching and its framing as a (transboundary) 
security concern not only resuscitated the plan to build the buffer zone, it radically 
changed the rules of accumulation, with the establishment of the GLC as a security zone 
becoming the grounds upon which accumulation could be realized. It is here where we 
locate the process of accumulation by securitization. We show how accumulation is 
enabled by a two-step process, each intimately tied to securing the GLC as an anti-
poaching buffer zone, with ÒsecuringÓ understood as both ÒacquiringÓ and Òmaking 
secure.Ó This begins with the securing of land, which is enabled by the dispossession of 
communities. Such dispossession removes potential poachers, makes the space easier to 
police, and enables the development of safari-based tourism. If such tourism-related 
accumulation requires land, it also requires wildlife. We illustrate how South Africa will 
provide wildlife as an incentive for the concession holders to protect KrugerÕs rhinos. 
Stated differently, the Kruger administration and private landholders are exchanging 
non-economic capital: that is, security capital, embodied in the buffer zone, for natural 
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capital, embodied in wildlife. We then bring these threads together to illustrate how 
security-oriented enclosures of land and wildlife act as green spatial fixes for capital. 
 
4.i. Securing Land, Dispossessing Resident Communities 
Prior to the GLC, the Mozambican borderlands were a patchwork of private 
concessions and communal and state lands. To build the GLC, the Mozambican state has 
worked with private landholders to integrate the existing concessions, standing at 
134,000 hectares, into a unitary and integrated conservancy/buffer zone. Consolidation 
also demands the concession holders build a fence over 200 kms long from the 
Elefants/Olifants to the Crocodile Rivers not along the border with Kruger but rather 
along the conservancyÕs eastern boundary. Perhaps most profoundly, consolidation 
entails filling in the ÒgapsÓ within the conservancy where no reserves existed, and where 
other land-uses were present, by granting new concessions to investors. One prime 
example is the 78,000 hectares Twin City Ecoturismo (TCE) project. Hence, these 
ÒgapsÓ are not small. Such enclosure is dispossessing resident communities in various 
ways, playing a key role in enabling accumulation. This dispossession, however, is 
motivated primarily by security rather than economic interests, showing how 
securitization enables accumulation. Let us pull this apart, beginning with how 
dispossession is unfolding.   
 In some places where communities still reside, including within these gaps, the 
project requires their relocation beyond its borders. This is the case with the TCE 
reserve, which has evicted and relocated three communities totaling over 90 households 
with the possibility of more to come as the reserve acquires more land (Interviews, 
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2014). What remains in the villages, including houses, will be burned down to prevent 
people from returning and to encourage those who want to remain to leave (Interviews, 
2013). Along with eviction, concession-holders are instituting further restrictions aimed 
at local communities regarding access to resources inside the conservancy, amounting to 
more indirect forms of dispossession. Hunting by community members, for instance, is 
banned within the GLC (Interviews, 2012, 2013). Once removed, all communities will 
be prohibited from entering the GLC without authorization, resulting in the further 
curtailment of access to land and resources. These prohibitions will be enforced by the 
reservesÕ private security forces and further facilitated by the imminent erection of the 
GLCÕs eastern boundary fence (Interviews, 2012, 2013, 2014). These in fact will work in 
partnership to effectively lock resources within the conservancy while keeping local 
populations out. These processes will, at minimum, enable more space for wildlife and 
related tourist activities. The GLC hence stands as a somewhat classic example of green 
and neoliberal conservation practice as accumulation by dispossession given that the 
conservancy entails the enclosure and privatization of large tracts of land and 
accompanying resources, enabled by the dispossession of resident residents. Once freed 
up in this way, these resources allow the generation of conservation-related capital 
accumulation.  
But the GLC differs in a fundamental way: communities there are being 
displaced first and foremost on poaching-related security grounds. Security concerns in 
the GLC insist that it is too difficult to police this space with communities living inside 
it, especially in strategic locations where rhino-poaching traffic is high, and given that 
community members are themselves involved with poaching activities (Interviews, 
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2013, 2014). For instance, the former manager of one of the reserves explained how the 
removal of the community of Honuane (carried out by a private company) was an 
important step in the securing the area of the GLC and Kruger from further rhino 
poaching given that the community harbored poachers (Interview, 2013). Hence, village 
removal is an anti-poaching strategy with dispossession productive of security. Not 
limited to the GLC, we see similar security-related dispossession unfolding in 
MozambiqueÕs Limpopo National Park (LNP) immediately to the north (Lunstrum, 
Forthcoming; Interviews, 2013, 2014) (see Figure 2). Resettlement as an anti-poaching 
strategy in both places is built atop a discourse of security that constructs entire groups 
of people as joint conservation-security threats, particularly as potential rhino poachers 
(and those who harbor them) who are heavily armed, increasingly dangerous, and who 
pose a threat to (South African) national security (Lunstrum, 2014). This works to 
legitimize their removal and other dispossessory and oppressive tactics, including the 
restriction of hunting, the erection of fences, and even the raiding of communities to 
seek out rhino horn, firearms, and potential poachers themselves (Interviews, 2012, 
2013). Furthermore, whereas members of these communities used to live, hunt, farm, 
and raise livestock in the space of what is now the GLC, now simply being in that space 
is grounds for arrest. In short, conservation security concerns provoke displacement, and 
they equally shape the types of dispossessions that unfold.  
Accumulation by securitization is thus an example of green grabbing where the 
Òdiscourses through which land and resources are appropriated for green ends also 
construct the people who live there in particular waysÓ (Fairhead et al, 2012, 251). Rural 
communities in particular are routinely portrayed as environmentally irresponsible 
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peasants, a common practice used to legitimize their dispossession and the enclosure of 
common land and resources (Brockington, 2002; Li, 2007; Neumann, 1998; Ojeda, 
2012; Spence, 1999). More than this, residents in and around the GLC are rendered 
environmentally destructive security threats: as rhino poachers who are heavily armed, 
increasingly dangerous, and who jeopardize national security (Lunstrum, 2014; also see 
Devine, 2014; Ojeda, 2012; Ybarra, 2012). More broadly, such rewriting of peasants as 
security risks in need of eviction is a disconcerting outgrowth of the growing integration 
of conservation, tourism, and security practice.  
Beyond explicitly organizing and financing displacement from the conservancy, 
the private landholders are working to secure the GLC as a buffer zone in other ways. 
These include the hiring, equipping, and training of paramilitary security forces to patrol 
the concessions and building or otherwise investing in security infrastructure, ranging 
from telecommunications and surveillance equipment to security outposts along the 
fence lines. The development of security infrastructure also includes the construction of 
a new road outside the GLC designed to provide an ÒalternativeÓ transportation route to 
communities as an explicit means of shutting down their use of roads within the 
conservancy. Concession holders must also build a perimeter fence that keeps wildlife in 
and people out.4 While these might seem removed from questions of dispossession, they 
play a pivotal role in ensuring that communities remain locked out.  
 
4.ii. Economic Incentives for SecurityÉ or Exchanges of Non-Economic Capital: 
Wildlife for Security 
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Despite having land and investing heavily in measures to secure this space, GLC 
concession holders and investors are currently operating at a loss because they are 
missing the main thing required to attract tourists: wildlife. The Mozambican war had 
devastated wildlife in the borderlands from which it has never recovered (Interviews, 
2012, 2013). This stands in stark contrast to KrugerÕs abundance of game. The Kruger 
administration has agreed to drop the apartheid-era international border fence to allow 
wildlife to repopulate the conservancy but only after the GLC secures rhinos by 
precluding the movement of poachers into Kruger, making it a viable economic 
enterprise. It is here where we locate the incentive for private stakeholders to invest in 
security, namely guaranteeing security gives them access to KrugerÕs abundant wildlife, 
hence enabling accumulation by securitization.  
To expand, unlike more traditional forms of outsourcing to private actors, no 
monetary payment is given to the reserves by South Africa to protect its rhinos. Instead, 
payment comes in the form of promises to remove the international border fence, thus 
allowing wildlife to cross freely into the conservancy, bringing tourists and capital in 
their wake. As explained by the former manager of one of the reserves, with the removal 
of the fence, the GLC has the potential to become Òthe Kruger of MozambiqueÓ 
(Interview, 2013). There is even talk of eventually giving tourists the ability to cross 
freely within this soon-to-be-fenceless space (Interviews, 2013), which would enhance 
its tourism appeal and enable the generation of more profits. So, the promise and 
incentive for private actors to build the GLC as a security mechanism is indeed an 
economic one, but it takes a more circuitous path via promises of fence removal, the 
Accepted	Manuscript	-GEOFORUM	
	 23	
border-crossing bodies of wildlife, and hopes of flocking tourists well-endowed with 
leisure capital.  
There are several implications of this relationship for understanding 
accumulation by securitization. First, possibilities for accumulation so desired by the 
private concession holders in the GLC are not merely enabled by securitization but, in 
terms of wildlife, contingent upon it. This also shows how accumulation can happen 
through offering incentives for securitization (here as wildlife) in tandem with the 
securing and emptying of space. Furthermore, extending the insights of Neves and Igoe 
(2012), what we see here more broadly is an exchange of different types of non-
economic capital, namely natural capital and security capital. Through their investment 
in infrastructure, training, equipment and hiring of conservation-security professionals, 
the individual private reserves and GLC as a whole are able to accumulate a type of 
security capital related to anti-poaching known as Òenvironmental asset protectionÓ 
(Interviews, 2013, 2014). Anti-poaching thus becomes not just about conservation, but 
about producing a secure spaceÑfor wildlife and capitalÑthat will enable profits via 
tourism. More broadly, land and wildlife are natural capital that tourism and hunting 
enterprises need. In this case, they are held by the stateÑland by the Mozambican state, 
wildlife by the South African. The security capital needed by these two states, especially 
South Africa, can be generated by private actors, or at least in partnerships with them, 
and within a consolidated private conservancy. Hence, as the private actors in the GLC 
invest in security capital, this gets exchanged for natural capital in the form of South 
African wildlife. Furthermore, given the cross-border context and regional history of 
war-induced ecological destruction, this exchange plays out in a specific way within the 
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GLC. Yet it reflects a broader process whereby access to natural resources provides the 
necessary incentive for actors to invest in security practices and partnerships, what we 
see as a nascent theme in the conservation-security literature (see, for example, 
Cavanagh et al., 2015; Devine, 2014; Dunlap and Fairhead, 2014; Ferrads, 2004; Ojeda, 
2012; Ybarra, 2012). 
 
4.iii Security-oriented enclosures of land and wildlife as green spatial fixes  
Bringing together the above processes of land enclosure/dispossession and 
security-wildlife exchanges, we return to HarveyÕs concept of accumulation by 
dispossession and specifically the enclosure of assets and their release for private 
investment and commodification. Indeed, critical literature on neoliberal conservation 
has used this framework to analyze how biodiversity is enclosed and made available for 
private investment, sometimes leading to forms of green grabbing and dispossession (see 
above). The case of the GLC offers several contributions to this literature as assets are 
being enclosed and privatized in two interlocking ways, both tied to security interests. 
First, there is the enclosure of wildlife, a publicly held asset in South Africa owned by 
and under the control of the state as it is encompassed within Kruger National Park. This 
will be privatizedÑput under private controlÑonce it moves from Kruger across the 
border into Mozambique. Second, there is the (further) enclosure of land in 
Mozambique. While the Mozambican government promotes the privatization of land in 
the GLC on economic and ecological grounds, its support of the project (and underlying 
privatization) has been given far more urgency under the banner of anti-poaching 
security to protect KrugerÕs rhinos. In this sense, even the release of land in 
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Mozambique is tied to security concerns, reinforcing that the accumulation of both land 
and wildlife in the GLC, and hence their placement in private hands, are both instances 
of accumulation by securitization.  
What is occurring is therefore the privatization of state-held assets in the form of 
South African wildlife as it crosses the border and the further privatization of space, 
particularly smallholder agricultural lands in Mozambique. The GLC becomes an 
economically viable wildlife frontierÑa ÒgreenÓ spatial fix to the overaccumulation of 
capitalÑas these two phenomena come together, that is, as the bodies of wildlife cross 
an international border and, like the land they come to inhabit, become private assets. 
More broadly, and highlighting one of our core concerns, this accumulation is enabled 
by, and with the case of wildlife contingent upon, securitization. Capital accumulation in 
the GLC, therefore, is speculative, with private actors investing heavily in security in 
hopes that this will yield future profits.5 Accumulation thus flows not directly from 
dispossession, although this is important, but more directly through promises and 
practices of security. Like dispossession, securitization enables a non-economic means 
of capital accumulation. Dispossession and security are, however, intimately connected, 
as the dictates of security rationalize if not compel dispossession. 
 
5. The Dovetailing of Conservation-Security and Conservation-Based Capital 
Accumulation: New Actors and Novel Partnerships 
 
Standing behind the accumulation by securitization playing out within the GLC 
we see a complex network of actors and creation of new partnerships. This closely 
mirrors the broader features of neoliberal conservation and green grabbing. Where the 
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GLC differs is that the actors in question expand to include explicit security actors along 
with others motivated by security interests, underscoring an important feature of 
accumulation by securitization and securitized conservation more broadly. Twin City 
Ecoturismo (TCE), for example, is the largest reserve and investment in the GLC. TCE 
is made up of Twin City and Singita, two South African multinational companies, and a 
host of Mozambican business partners who rank among the countryÕs business and 
political elite and include the son of a former president and a former provincial governor. 
These Mozambican partners work to facilitate the acquisition of land by independently 
acquiring concessions. They then join the various independently-held concessions 
together into a consolidated holding by entering into a joint partnership with Twin City 
and Singita, which provide the capital needed for the development of the reserve, 
including security costs (Interviews, 2014). These new actors hence reflect a Ònew range 
of intermediary actorsÉ emerging as critical go-betweens to secure and enable resource 
appropriations,Ó which are enabling not only green grabs in general (Fairhead et al., 
2012, 250) but security-oriented green grabs in particular.  
Importantly, these Mozambican partners, who are essentially national 
intermediaries, also facilitate negotiations with local communities, including 
negotiations concerning their displacement and relocation. This is a crucial step for both 
accumulation and, at least in theory, security as we saw earlier. At meetings with various 
communities to discuss compensation and logistics concerning their removal from the 
TCE concessions, it was not a state representative negotiating with the community but 
rather a Mozambican business partner, with compensation coming from a private South 
African company. The business partner explained his role as a facilitator saying, ÒWe are 
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in a battle [of rhino-poaching] that we are trying to turn around, and part of this is the 
resettlement of communities and showing them what the advantages areÓ (Interview, 
2013).  
The prominence of these private actors reflects the thoroughly neoliberal way in 
which Mozambique supports the creation of the GLC as a conservation-security 
apparatus. First, it has given the reservesÕ private security forces a great deal of latitude 
in their rhino-security efforts including the ability to conduct ambushes and raids on 
communities, collect intelligence and engage in surveillance, deploy roadblocks, make 
arrests, and evict populations (Interviews, 2012, 2013). More than this, the central 
government now delegates the functions of state security to the private reserves. More 
explicitly, MozambiqueÕs national border patrol Guarda Fronteira along with local law 
enforcement stationed within the boundaries of their concession take orders from the 
concessionsÕ heads of security. This means that Guarda Fronteira is stationed where it is 
told to be and brought into security operations (or not) at the discretion of the reservesÕ 
security managers. Going one step further, once the GLCÕs eastern perimeter fence is 
erected, border patrol itself will become the charge of the private reserves. Guarda 
Fronteira will hence be moved further into Mozambique to patrol the GLCÕs eastern 
boundary amounting to an effective re-territorialization of sovereignty. In fact, Guarda 
Fronteira will only be allowed to enter the conservancy when accompanied by reserve 
security forces (Interview, 2014). 
Furthermore, the Mozambican state has supported the development of the GLC 
by engaging with and devolving authority to Licoturismo, which is an association of the 
independent concession holders constituting the GLC (GoM and Licoturismo, 2012). 
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The state has signed a memorandum with Licoturismo that, in addition to formalizing 
the GLC, secures a spot for the association on the Great Limpopo Transfrontier ParkÕs 
Joint Management Board as an observer-member (GoM and Licoturismo, 2012). More 
importantly, because Licoturismo, as a private Mozambican entity, cannot engage or 
negotiate directly with South Africa, there is now a state-to-state memorandum under 
consideration. As explained by a former director of the Mozambican National 
Directorate for Conservation Areas (DNAC), this would enable 
Bring[ing] the principles and objectives of Licoturismo [to the table and] assume 
them as the [Mozambican] stateÕs [own]... It will be, it must be a relationship 
between states. But, I think that although the memorandum will be between 
states, there will not be any problems with any relationships between private and 
state actors when it comes to day-to-day work (Interview, 2013).  
 
The memorandum, which is more broadly aimed at Òjoint law enforcement and the 
rehabilitation of the tourism business in that [GLC] areaÓ (Interview, 2013), would, 
moreover, give the GLC concession holders more control within both realms. This 
demonstrates yet another way in which security and tourism closely align (also see 
Devine, 2014; Ojeda, 2012). It equally illustrates how the Mozambican state is 
devolving authority even in the realm of security, traditionally understood as the proper 
realm of the state, to private actors.  
The memorandum also reflects the GLCÕs distinct bi-national nature, a reality 
leading to the creation of novel transnational partnerships involving state-to-state-to-
non-state actors. For example, and as described above, the South African state and 
security forces are cooperating not only with their Mozambican counterparts, but with 
private actors in Mozambique. In fact, with regards to anti-poaching and securing the 
international border and Kruger, personnel from various reserves in the GLC work more 
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closely with their South African equivalents in Kruger than Mozambican state security 
forces. The influence of South Africa is evident in more material ways as well. As part 
of the agreement to remove the international border fence, the GLCÕs eastern boundary 
fenceÑlocated squarely in Mozambique anywhere from ten to forty kilometres from the 
borderÑmust adhere to KrugerÕs fence specifications and standards. Hence, what we see 
in the GLC is South African state actors having some modicum of controlÑbut not 
ownershipÑover land that has been privatized in Mozambique. This is a reversal of 
sorts from trends in the literature outlined earlier that shows how private actors have 
some control, but not ownership in state conservation lands (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 
2012; Bscher, 2009; Corson, 2011; Kelly, 2011). With the GLC, it is the South African 
state that has a great deal of control, even while lacking ownership. Moreover, the GLC 
demonstrates how the interlocking logics of wildlife tourism and security motivate the 
creation of a complex network of heterogeneous actors and relationships that defy Òold 
Ôstate-to-stateÕ or Ôbusiness-to-businessÕ combinationsÓ (Peluso and Lund, 2011, 670), 
that here traverse scales and an international border. Focusing on this expansion of 
actors also allows us to grasp that the GLC in particular, all told, is more than a 
consolidation of private reserves: it is a consolidation and strengthening of security 
services.  
While the details of the actors and partnerships building the GLC are specific to 
this case, our broader point is that security interests significantly expand the roster of 
actors standing behind conservation-related accumulation. This includes both explicit 
security actors, including the security forces of private reserves and state security actors, 
and others motivated by security concerns, in this case two states. This reflects a trend 
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emerging in conservation-security practice, reflected in the related scholarship, in which 
there is a general blurring of security and economic actors: while the former help make 
accumulation possible by freeing up land and resources, the latter are increasingly 
implicated in producing security (Devine, 2014; Ferrads, 2004; Ojeda, 2012; Ybarra, 
2012).  
While we can only be suggestive here, the expansion of conservation-security 
actors also underscores that security dictates enable accumulation in yet another form: 
via expanded prospects for conservation-security employment and related opportunities. 
In the GLC this includes new security-related jobs within the private reserves, including 
those directed at patrolling and surveilling the conservancy, border patrol, building and 
maintaining security infrastructure, and even organizing community relocation and 
resettlement. Elsewhere, we see the expansion of state conservation-security actors 
including special anti-poaching units and national armies (Alexander, 2014; Cavanagh et 
al., 2015; Devine, 2014; Lombard, 2012; Lunstrum, 2014; Ybarra, 2012), the rise of 
private conservation-security firms such as the South African anti-poaching firm 
Protrack (Protrack, 2015), other organizations that offer military training for park guards 
(Africalab, 2015; IAPF, 2015), conservation soldiers for hire (Cavanagh et al., 2015; 
Lombard, 2012), and employment and investment opportunities tied to new conservation 
surveillance technologies such as drones (Lunstrum 2014). All of these opportunities 
generate profit as they work to secure conservation space. 
 
6. Conclusion: Accumulation by Securitization and the Creation of New Wildlife 
Frontiers 
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As a way of further underscoring key features of the meeting of security, 
conservation, and accumulation, we close by turning to the trope of the frontier to 
highlight the consolidation of sovereignty playing out within the GLC and then suggest 
several ways in which the GLC may prove a cautionary tale. We suggested in the 
introduction that the GLC is emerging as a new wildlife frontier. Peluso and Lund (2011, 
668), in their study of Ònew frontiersÓ of land control, define frontiers as Òsites where 
authorities, sovereignties, and hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently 
being challenged by new enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes.Ó The GLC 
is in this sense indeed a new frontier with new land-uses, new formations of control and 
authority, new enclosures, and indeed new possibilities for accumulation.  
The GLCÕs precursor of the non-consolidated Mozambican borderlands, 
however, suggests an older notion of the frontier as well. This is one understood as an 
unruly, threatening space in which centralized state power is weak at best and in which 
economic opportunities, while perhaps dangerous, are abundant. As such, this 
borderland frontier as transit route for rhino poachers into Kruger was, and largely still 
is, an unruly space of lucrative illicit movement into Kruger. The new wildlife frontier of 
the GLC is equally a site of lucrative opportunity: here opportunities for accumulation 
tied to wildlife tourism and conservation, which are contingent on shutting down 
poaching-related economic opportunities. Yet given the anti-poaching security rationale 
standing behind the GLC, the new frontier is, perhaps ironically, one over which 
sovereignty is not absent but rather consolidated. This is not simple state sovereignty but 
sovereignty established by two states in partnership with private land holders, realized 
by their security forces. As this consolidation of power and security enables the 
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landholders to tap into the new opportunities it provides, this new frontier is realized 
through processes securitization. Understanding the GLC as a new wildlife frontier, 
moreover, highlights that consolidation itself takes on two integrated meanings: just as 
the individual private reserves are consolidated into a single, unified buffer zone, 
sovereignty over the space is itself consolidated, especially given the buildup of state-
sanctioned security forces and removal of communities deemed potentially disruptive.  
The GLC is tellingly understood as a frontier in another sense as well: one 
productive of dispossession. Namely, framed as an unruly landscape overflowing with 
opportunity, here for wildlife-related tourism, resident communities are dispossessed as 
a means of ÒtamingÓ this space and realizing these opportunities. This hence mirrors a 
common practice of land appropriation within settlement frontiers with deeply colonial 
roots (Cronon, 2011; Spence, 1999). While the long-term impacts of such displacement 
are not yet known, we do know for certain the GLC is provoking the outright eviction of 
certain communities and inciting troubling restrictions on access and movement through 
the now consolidated conservancy.  
The reality of dispossession and the broader context of securitized conservation 
from which it emerges lead us to read the GLC as a cautionary tale. Looking at and 
beyond the conservancy, one of our core concerns is that framing conservation in 
security terms makes it more difficult to criticize related dispossessions. In other words, 
conservation-related security interests act as a depoliticized alibi for green grabbing, 
explicitly green accumulation through green dispossession. We see this in the GLC, the 
LNP to the north, and are likely to see it in other commercial poaching hotspots as a 
range of conservation actors work to secure and consolidate existing conservation space 
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or create new secure wildlife frontiers. Furthermore, as wildlife and wildlife products 
become increasingly valuable due to growing affluence and growing demand, we will 
probably see more and more green grabs or enclosure and privatization of land in the 
name of conservation security rather than merely the drive to amass capital, as we see 
with the GLC and LNP. In addition to securitization likely being more violent than other 
forms of conservation, we are troubled by the phenomena of states devolving significant 
authority to private security forces (who then give orders to state security actors). To be 
more precise, private actors may not be accountable, especially to vulnerable rural 
communities, in the same way that state actors are in practice or at least in theory. 
Making matters even more disconcerting, dispossession as a security strategy may 
backfire. There is ample evidence elsewhere, including elsewhere in the GLTP, of 
residents evicted from protected areas, or otherwise barred from realizing their benefits, 
who resist such exclusion by engaging in poaching (Mavhunga, 2014; also see 
Neumann, 1998; Brockington, 2002). If our prediction is correct, this would reinforce a 
more far-reaching pattern of securitized conservation measures backfiring by alienating 
the very communities from which they need support (Duffy, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014). 
To be up front, we take these security concerns seriously. We do not want to see 
the disappearance of the rhino. But how do we respond when anti-poaching strategies 
translate into the creation of new securitized wildlife frontiers that dispossess already 
vulnerable communities and concentrate capital in private hands? While we can only be 
suggestive here, the answer must begin by placing calls for displacement as a 
conservation-security strategyÑanti-poaching or otherwiseÑwithin the long and 
globally expansive history that has rendered resident communities as conservationÕs 
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enemies. 
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1 Research for this paper consisted of 55 key informant and semi-structured interviews with GLC 
investors, GLC project implementers/consultants, GLTP/Kruger/LNP officials, Kruger 
rangers, community leaders/members, and Mozambican and South African conservation 
officials. Conducted between 2012 and 2014, with 4 research trips lasting between 3 and 8 
weeks, we held interviews in Shangaan with the assistance of a translator, Portuguese and 
English. In addition, [co-authorÕs name] engaged in several days of participant observation of the 
work of GLC implementers between 2012 and 2014, which offered possibilities for both 
sustained informal discussion and a view into some of the concrete practices through which the 
GLC is being built. We supplemented interviews and participant observation with analysis of 
primary and secondary documents, including GLC planning documents, maps, and newspaper 
articles, which were gathered online and generously provided by interviewees.  
2
 While securing the border ties in to broader security practices in South Africa (Humphreys and 
Smith, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014), rhino poaching is the security issue along the border with 
Mozambique given concern over rhino and related cross-border armed-incursions. 
3
 While many concession holders also see biodiversity conservation as a priority of the GLC, 
they made it clear on several occasions that their investment in conservation must yield a profit 
(Interviews 2013, 2014). 
4	Others	have	noted	that	securitization	may	actually	have	negative	ecological	consequences	(see,	for	
example,	Sayre	and	Knight,	2010).	This	is	possible	in	the	GLC	but	we	do	not	see	it	as	a	major	issue	
given	the	fact	that	the	built	security	infrastructure	in	the	GLC	is	of	relative	low-intensity	compared	
to	that	which	is	occurring	along	the	U.S.-Mexico	border	and	that	securitization	here,	unlike	in	the	US,	
is	being	done	by	actors	who	have	an	interest	in	developing	conservation	landscapes	and	increasing	
the	cross-border	mobility	of	wildlife.	
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5
 Just as Kelly (2011, 685) argues that with accumulation by dispossession the act of enclosure 
may be Òwell removed from the act of accumulation," securitization may similarly be removed.	
